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ABSTRACT

Exploiting a Grading Policy Shift as an Instrument to Estimate Impact of Grading on
Teacher Evaluations
by
Gavin R. Johnson
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Ben Blau, Ph.D.
Department: Economics and Finance
Professors at a university plausibly have an incentive to give higher grades to
students, and these higher grades will be reflected in student evaluations, which are used
to assess teaching quality, which could have career impacts. This paper takes advantage of
a policy shift at the business school at Utah State University that introduced suggested caps
on the average course grades that teachers gave. This allowed instrumental variable
analysis to correct for bias in OLS estimations of these impacts. The correlation between
grades and students' evaluations of teachers was found to be positive suggesting that
student evaluations of teachers are biased by the grades that teachers give, making them
less useful as a guiding metric.
(24 pages)
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Introduction
Student evaluations of teachers are common in higher education and are
increasingly prevalent. They are used to assess teachers and courses and can have career
impacts. Thus, teachers have incentive to inflate grades to buy better evaluations.
Significant positive correlations have been noted since the 1970s. Theoretical research has
suggested the effect of the incentive and other reasons for grade inflation. However, this
process involves endogenous effects. Grades could hypothetically impact the evaluations
students give teachers, and wanting better evaluations, teachers could give better grades.
Therefore, estimates of how grades are correlated to teacher evaluations could be biased,
and might not be anything like we expect.
Utah State University introduced a policy at the beginning of 2014 to cap the
average grades of individual classes. This policy is a general policy, and so should be
exogenous to both student evaluations and the grades that teachers assign prior to the policy
change. The change should lower the average grades of classes that would otherwise have
grades above the cap. This study uses this policy to estimate the correlation between grades
and student teacher evaluations using an instrumental variable approach, and attempts to
find if grades do affect evaluations, and if so, to what extent.
1. Related Literature
The general consensus in the literature is that higher grades lead to better teacher
evaluations. However, this is not necessarily present or statistically significant once
controls are included. Centra (2003), and Marsh and Roche (2000) found no significant
effect of grades once other controls were included, with the regression coefficient of grades
on evaluations fluctuating around zero. The early research by Holmes (1972) and Feldman
6

(1976) focused on the correlation between grades and evaluations, with some speculation
as to why this might be, while later research attempted to better quantify this result and
other factors that could cause this. Feldman (1976) found that any correlation was small,
but not necessarily representing a causal relationship. Holmes (1972) found that it was
rather the discrepancy between what grade a student thought they deserved and what they
received that explained evaluations better. Many possible factors exogenous to teacher
quality have been identified that could impact evaluations. Dewitte and Rogge (2011) noted
that ideally, these effects should be discounted for the purpose of actually evaluating the
teacher. Exogenous variables such as class size or how many classes students have taken
could impact evaluations.
One of the factors that has not been directly studied but has been noted in much of
the literature is that the evaluations can occur either before or after the grade for the course
is known by the student. While this largely depends on the institution, some instructors
communicate the predicted grades more clearly to students. This factor can lead to either
the expectations impacting the evaluations if the evaluations are conducted before the
grades are known, or confirmation effects if the grades received are higher or lower than
expected and then the evaluation is subsequently conducted (Feldman, 1976; Holmes,
1972). Teaching style, and not just quality, can impact evaluations. Stapleton addresses
this, and finds impacts even after controlling for other observables. The correlations
observed between grades and evaluations are different for different teachers, so possibly
teaching style impacts both.
Other unobservable factors can also impact evaluations: it has been noted that
“teacher productivity”, course load, learning, and other unobservables, can bias estimates
7

of how grades impact evaluations (see, for example, Ewing, 2012; Braga et al., 2014; and
De Witte and Rogge, 2011). This is due to the omitted variable bias that can occur, and
possible interactions between variables.
Multiple researchers, such as Love et al. (2010) and Eiszler (2002), have created
theoretical models and reasons behind motivations for grading and evaluations. It is noted
that there is a general incentive for teachers to inflate grades, as being liked as a teacher
can be a part of leading to tenure, as students may 'award' the teachers with better
evaluations.
This can also lead to endogeneity problems. Teachers very plausibly grade with the
evaluations in mind, and students plausibly evaluate with real or expected grades as a
motivator (Eiszler, 2002; Krautmann and Sander, 1999). Impact size and sign has been
estimated by using other teacher observables as an instrument in two stage least squares
regressions, finding results as predicted by incentive models (Krautmann and Sander,
1999).
Recently, grade inflation has been noted, and there have been efforts to reduce grade
inflation. If it is grading higher than other teachers that matters for later outcomes and
evaluations, then “inflation” is expected to continue. Schools can implement regulations to
attempt to halt or reverse grade inflation, such as grading on a preset curve or with an
average grade as a goal (Butcher et al., 2014). Butcher et al. observed the implementation
of such a policy at Wellesley, using individual level data. They found results such as the
negative impact being more damaging to minorities, and used better controls than most
studies such as SAT scores. They found that evaluations were impacted, but not very much.

8

2. Description of the Data
The data is a collection of grades given in courses in the business school at Utah
State University, and data collected on the teacher evaluations of the classes. Also included
in the dataset is some basic information about the classes, such as instructor and the size of
the class. The data begins in 2011, and was collected through 2014. This is the full range
of data that was available as of this writing. In 2011, Utah State implemented 'The IDEA
System' from the third party 'The IDEA Center' to evaluate teachers. Students complete
evaluations at the end of the semester, before grades are received, on the teacher and course.
These evaluations are a series of questions with possible responses ranging from 1 to 5,
and also give students an opportunity to provide written feedback on the teacher or course.
The aggregated teacher evaluations are available to all students within the university, as
well as to faculty. The data is used for assessment by the university management of courses
and professors, for management and faculty decisions.
Average course GPA is the arithmetic average of the GPA equivalent to the grade
each student in the course received. GPA is calculated using the scale used at Utah State
University, with 4 being the highest. Only those students who received a final grade are
included in the calculation of GPA. This excludes those who withdrew from the class, and
those who didn't receive standard grades. This excludes 1.52% of all individual grade
records.
2.1. Evaluation Specifics
Most important to this study is that the students are directly asked in the evaluation
to evaluate the quality of the teacher and the course on a 1-5 scale. There are other questions
that ask students to evaluate the course on metrics such as: gaining factual knowledge,
9

learning fundamental principles, learning to apply material, developing teamwork, etc.
Additionally, the evaluation includes measures of 'progress on relevant objectives', which
are 3 to 5 of the metrics that are chosen by the professor to be 'important', or 'essential', and
is a weighted average of these metrics.
The evaluation survey also includes the questions: 'I really wanted to take the course
regardless of who taught it?' and 'As a rule, I put forth more effort than other students on
academic work.' These questions are used, along with class size, subject, and other data to
create 'adjusted scores' of various metrics. An example of this is an overarching summary
score that is provided: it utilizes this adjusted data, averaging together other metrics with
no clear reason given for the weighting. These adjusted scores are designed to correct for
some of the exogenous factors that impact evaluations.
These two questions in particular are interesting because they ask students post hoc
to assess their desires and effort. The average 'effort' that students in the data set responded
was 3.94, where 3 suggests an average amount of effort. This shows that students do not
give unbiased responses.
2.2. Grade Policy
A policy was implemented in the business school at the beginning of 2014 in which
there was a suggested ceiling on course GPA. This was a GPA of 3.2 for upper division
courses, and 2.8 for lower division courses. Grade data is limited, and does not include
identifying information of individuals. This grade ceiling was not strictly enforced, but
rather was suggested and encouraged. Some professors were already grading below this
standard, and so should not have been impacted by the policy. The number who should
have been impacted is shown in table 2.
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The policy was communicated directly to professors and not directly to students,
nor was it widely publicized. Therefore, we assume that the policy does not impact how
students evaluate professors except through the channel of how professors grade. Graphs
1 and 2 demonstrate the distribution of average grades before and after the policy was
implemented for the upper division courses. There is no visible shift in the distribution.
Graphs 3 and 4 demonstrate the same for the lower division courses. There appears to be a
very visible shift. Before the policy, 45.8% of upper division courses and 61.2% of lower
division courses were above the later instituted gap, while after the policy shift, 42.5% of
upper division courses and 38% of lower division courses were still graded above the cap.
The policy seems to have been followed better for lower division courses.
3. Empirical Methods
The main model used in this paper is an instrumental variable approach, where a
binary variable representing whether the new grade policy was in effect is used as an
instrument for the average course GPA. This method attempts to provide an unbiased
estimate of how the grades that teachers give influence the evaluations that students make.
As noted in the literature section, teachers may attempt to 'buy' good evaluations by grading
leniently, and students may 'reward' teachers who grade leniently with good evaluations.
As there is a causality loop, there is a form of endogeneity that may bias results when the
impact of grades on evaluations is estimated using a standard least squares model.
As the students complete the evaluations before they actually receive final grades,
any correlation between grades and the evaluations will be due to information that students
already have of their grades, and their expectations. The amount of information that
students have of their grades might vary by course and professor.
11

There is suspected heterogeneity in the model due to there being many different
professors and different courses. This problem is mitigated in the model by including
course-professor fixed effects. This creates a fixed effects estimate for courses taught by a
single professor. This model thus will not include courses taught by professors who taught
only before or after the policy came into place, and will provide fixed effects for courses
taught by the same professor both before and after the policy enters effect.
Regressions are also conducted including only lower or upper division courses, or
both, due to the differing impact of the policy on the lower and upper divisions.
As follows is how the model would be constructed using OLS:
Evaluation score=α+βgrades+controls+μ (1)
Due to the issue of reverse causation, a two stage least squares model is used, with grades
being instrumented by the binary variable of whether the policy was in place. Additionally,
courses taught by the same professor that were already beneath the suggested cap are
excluded from the regressions, as they should not be impacted by the new policy. They are
included separately, for comparison. Results were also obtained for standard OLS and OLS
with fixed effects, for means of comparison between the OLS and 2SLS models and also
for comparison with other studies.
4. Empirical Results
The first stage for the upper division of courses, the regression of the postimplementation dummy variable on average course GDP is both insignificant and has a
positive sign, yielding a coefficient of 0.021 with a standard error of 0.06. This suggests
that the policy had no effect on upper division grading. This could be due to several factors:
upper division courses are generally smaller and more personal, and the students are more
12

likely to be in the major and possibly know the professor personally.
Additionally, the group of teachers that should be unaffected by the policy due to
already grading beneath the threshold also do not appear to have been impacted by the
policy. The first stage regression also has a positive sign, and is insignificant. (Coefficient:
0.05, standard error: 0.06). This is shown in the 'Robustness' section below.
In table 3, the results of regressions using the teaching quality metric as the
dependent variable are presented. They show that the grades are positively correlated with
the evaluations, and significantly so. This is consistent with prior research on the subject.
Tables 4 through 7 are the results of two stage least square regressions. The results
of two stage least squares regressions of Average Course GPA on the unadjusted Teacher
Quality evaluation are in Table 4. Under all of the specifications below, the estimated
coefficient is positive and significant at the p<.1 level or less.
Tables 5 through 7 use the same two stage least squares regressions as table 4, but
with the left hand side variable being the evaluation of the course as a whole, progress on
fundamental indicators, and the summary score indicator respectively. The results are
similar to using teacher quality as the independent variable, but with different scale and
statistical significance. Notably, the summary score seems to be much more responsive to
grades than the other indicators do.
5. Robustness Tests
Table 8 shows the first stage results for professors who should not have been
impacted by the policy: those who were already grading below the recommended ceiling.
This is a regression using the average course GPA as the independent variable, and the
binary variable representing whether the grade policy was in effect.
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None of the coefficients have the negative coefficient that would be expected if they
had been impacted by the policy, and have coefficients that are statistically insignificant
and practically indistinguishable from 0. This suggests that only the group that should have
been impacted by the policy was. This also suggests that it is likely that the change in
grading that is observed was likely due to the policy, and not some other factor.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
The policy seems to have had an effect on grading, especially in lower division
courses. As the policy was not strictly enforced, but was rather more like a guideline,
teachers had the discretion to choose to follow the policy or not. Before the policy, 45.8%
of upper division courses and 61.2% of lower division course were above the cap, while
after the policy was implemented, 42.5% of upper division courses and 38% of lower
division courses were still graded above the cap. The first stage results that were obtained
suggest that the policy was much more effective for lower division courses.
Using the instrumental variable regression, it appears that the average grades in a
course are still positively correlated with the teacher and course evaluations. Coefficient
estimates are much larger using the 2SLS approach. The estimates are consistently positive,
and with comparable coefficients even with different models, such as not including the
teacher-course fixed effects or with weighted regressions.
All of the regressions that use class size weights also yield larger coefficients. This
could be due to smaller classes being more personal, or that with higher enrollment teachers
are more willing to give lower grades and that evaluations are also negatively correlated
with larger class sizes. (NB: I ran regressions, this seems to be the case, and regression
results change when 'Enrolled' is included as a control.)
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The results of this paper as a whole suggest that there is a positive correlation
between grades and teacher evaluations, and using the instrumental variable approach to
remove feedback effect bias, suggests that the correlation coefficient is more than twice as
large as results obtained through OLS.
While these results are consistent for several different independent variables from
the teacher evaluations and with different model specifications, the results may not be
externally valid. It is possible that other universities, or even other schools within Utah
State University might not have similar properties. Students select schools, and schools
select students and have different policies. Also, implicit in the model used in this paper is
the assumption that students did not change how they evaluate teachers with the policy
change, and how a policy is implemented could cause changes to be path dependent.
However, as far as the results are valid, they suggest that there is a correlation
between leniency in grading and how students evaluate the teachers, and that this might be
a larger effect than that suggested by an OLS regression. Therefore, the teachers could have
an incentive to give artificially high grades to receive better evaluations, which can make
a real impact on their careers and also distort management decisions.
The policy implication is that management decisions should possibly take this into
account by holding evaluations before grades are given, mandating an institution wide
grading standard, or by simply understanding the biases in the evaluation itself. Taking
advantage of a policy shift at the business school at Utah State University that introduced
suggested caps on the average course grades that teachers gave, an instrumental variable
was constructed to predict the average class GPA. Resulting estimated coefficients for the
correlation between grades and student teacher evaluations were about twice as large as
15

obtained from OLS. The correlation between grades and students' evaluations of teachers
is positive. This suggests that student evaluations of teachers are biased by the grades that
teachers give, which can make them less useful as a gauge of teacher quality. This is
consistent with what has been termed Goodhart’s Law: “When a measure becomes a target,
it ceases to be a good measure.” (Strathern, 1997) Management should take possible biases
of measures into account.
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics
Measure
Mean
Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

# of observations

Average Course GPA 3.03

1.88

3.89

0.44

265

Enrolled in Course

73.9

11

269

55.5

262

Teacher Quality

4.2

2.3

5

0.46

261

Course Quality

4.0

2.7

5

0.42

261

effort

3.94

3

4.6

0.22

261

Table 2: Courses falling within grade policy window, by division
Number of courses below
teacher pairings
graded above ceiling
before policy

Percent above

Upper and Lower
divisions

196

69

74%

Lower Division

122

31

80%

Upper Division

74

38

66%

Table 3: OLS results
1

2

3

4

5

6

Grade
Coefficient
(s.e)

.217**(.06 .203**(.0 .406**(.10 .406**(.08 .305**(.07 .463**(.09
3)
71)
2)
5)
9)
5)

Lower
division

Both

Lower

Upper

teachcourseid
dum

both
Yes

Weight by
Enrollment
Sample size

both

261

149

112

261

both
Yes

Yes

Yes

261

261
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Table 4: 2SLS Teacher Quality Result
1

2

3

4

5

First Stage

-.147*(.067) -.258**
(.099)

-.277**(.100 -.169**(.043 -.147**(.042
)
)
)

Coefficient
(s.e)

1.024' (.565) .727'(.394)

1.013'(.521)

.792**(.250) .799**(0.297
)

Lower
division

Both

Lower

Lower

Lower

Yes

Yes

Lower

teachcoursei
ddum
Weight by
Enrollment
Sample size

Yes
192

':p<.10 *: p<.05 **: p<.01

118

118

Yes
118

118

Robust standard errrors

Table 5: 2SLS Course Evaluation Results
CourseRaw
1
2

3

4

5

First Stage

-.147*(.067) -.258**
(.099)

-.285**(.097 -.169**(.043 -.177**(.043
)
)
)

Coefficient
(s.e)

0.78 (.479)

.47(.31)

.738'(.39)

.485'(.25)

.583*(0.255)

Lower
division

Both

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Yes

Yes

teachcoursei
ddum
Weight by
Enrollment
Sample size

Yes
192

118

118

Yes
118

118
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Table 6: 2SLS Progress on Fundamental Indicators Evaluation Results
FundRaw
1
2
3
4

5

First Stage

-.145*(.069) -.216**
(.103)

-.224**(.099) -.171**(.04 -.178**(.044)
4)

Coefficient
(s.e)

.60 (.42)

.306(.33)

.58(.43)

.33(.28)

.48'(0.27)

Lower
division

Both

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Yes

Yes

teachcourseid
dum
Weight by
Enrollment
Sample size

Yes
169

106

106

Table 7: 2SLS Summary Score Evaluation Results
SummaryScore
1
2
3

Yes
106

4

106

5

First Stage

-.152*(.066) -.263**
(.098)

-.285**(.096 -.169**(.043 -.177**(.043
)
)
)

Coefficient
(s.e)

13.4' (7.4)

8.9'(5.1)

12.9'(7.1)

9.6*(3.8)

10.7*(4.1)

Lower
division

Both

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Yes

Yes

teachcoursei
ddum
Weight by
Enrollment
Sample size

Yes
193

119

119

Yes
119

119
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Table 8: First stage results
Both divisions

Lower Division

Upper Division

Coefficient

0.020

0.054

0.158

Robust standard
error

0.063

0.058

5.00

P value

0.75

0.36

0.98
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Figure 1: Upper division distribution of grades pre-implementation of policy
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Figure 2: Upper division distribution of grades post-implementation of policy
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Figure 3: Lower division distribution of grades pre-implementation of policy
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Figure 4: Lower division distribution of grades post-implementation of policy
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